I. INTRODUCTION
In 2007, Feld Entertainment, Inc. ("Feld"), which produces circus shows under the trade name Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, sued the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals ("ASPCA") and other animal welfare and wildlife organizations and individuals for alleged offenses related to a lawsuit wherein the defendants-then plaintiffs-had unsuccessfully sued Feld for allegedly mistreating its circus elephants.
1 A former Feld employee, Tom Rider, was the star witness for the then-plaintiffs in what we will call the "elephant case."
2 Rider purportedly quit his job as an elephant attendant because of the mistreatment of an elephant he worked with, and he testified about the alleged abuse of the animals, which was central to the elephant case. 3 His testimony in the elephant case lacked credibility and was unpersuasive, 4 but remunerative. 5 Indeed, Rider was paid handsomely for his service in the losing cause, having received cash payments exceeding $190,000, plus "non-cash compensation, such as a van, hotel rooms, cell phone use, a video camera, zoom Rider's compensation as a fact witness in the elephant case was extraordinary in its amount, structure, and purpose. The litigation is also remarkable because the payments to Rider-at least as reported in the district court opinion in the elephant case and as described in Feld's pleadings-were so glaringly improper and prejudicial.
11 At the same time, former employees of parties are frequently vital fact witnesses. 12 They often have unique factual knowledge. From former employees' perspectives, however, participating in litigation may take them away from their current jobs, thereby costing them income or vacation time, it may impede their self-employment or it may interrupt their retirements. It is therefore understandable that former employees may want to be paid for devoting time to litigation in which they have no stakes. They may well seek compensation for time spent testifying, meeting with lawyers, or otherwise assisting with case preparation. 13 Other fact witnesses likewise may be interested in compensation for their time connected to litigation.
14 In patent litigation, for example, an inventor who is a fact witness also may be an essential consultant who deserves compensation for time spent in the latter role. 15 Passersby who witness 6 . FEI Complaint, supra note 1, at 9; see also Am. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 73-83 (detailing the organizational defendants' payments to Rider in the underlying case and their alleged efforts to conceal and disguise them). accidents may be critical to the outcome in resulting litigation and parties may want to compensate them for taking time off from their jobs to testify. The list goes on. It was once the rule that fact witness compensation was limited to statutory witness fees or subpoena rates. 16 The prohibition on greater compensation rested on several factors, including the concern that such payments could entice fact witnesses to perjure themselves, the concern that greater compensation might simply influence witnesses to shade or shape their testimony in ways favorable to the parties paying them, the worry that greater compensation could price justice out of the reach of some parties, and the concern that extra compensation would create an appearance of impropriety. 17 Courts further considered fact witnesses' testimony to be their civic duty. 18 On the other hand, conscientious fact witnesses may be required to devote considerable time to preparing their testimony and actually testifying in cases in which they are called. The overwhelming majority of witnesses faithfully honor their oaths to testify truthfully; 19 assuming that their compensation is timely disclosed, witnesses' alleged biases attributable to such payments can be exposed on cross examination. 20 Not all witnesses believe that losing income or incurring unreimbursed expense in connection with litigation qualifies as civic duty. 21 In any event, over time, restrictions on fact witness compensation have loosened. 22 Compensating fact witnesses beyond *2-3 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2010) (concluding that a party's $100,000 lump sum payment to an the inventor of the patents-in-suit to consult in litigation would not support a claim that the party had unclean hands; although the inventor was already contractually required to cooperate with the party in litigation and to testify as needed, the contracts did not obligate the inventor to consult in litigation). 16. See, e.g., Wright v. Somers, 125 Ill. App. 256, 257 (1906) . The court noted that:
The legislative department of our State has declared that every witness attending in his own county upon trials in the courts of record shall be entitled to receive the sum of one dollar for each day's attendance and five cents per mile each way for necessary travel . . . . This is all the witness is entitled to receive. To demand more is forbidden by the policy and spirit of this statute. statutory witness fees and expenses to which they are entitled is now a common practice, and has been for some time. 23 But while restrictions on fact witness compensation are looser than they once were, they are not lax. 24 Lawyers and parties may not pay fact witnesses for their testimony, even if the testimony is truthful. 25 The general rule, in condensed form, is that lawyers and litigants may compensate fact witnesses for time spent testifying, preparing to testify, or assisting in the litigation, and may reimburse witnesses' associated expenses, provided that the amounts paid or reimbursed are reasonable, are not conditioned on the act of testifying or the content or substance of the witnesses' testimony, and are not contingent upon the outcome of the litigation. 26 Lawyers cannot condition fact witnesses' compensation on their agreements not to voluntarily speak with other parties or their counsel. 27 If a fact witness asks that her lawyer attend an interview, meeting, or deposition, it is generally permissible to pay that lawyer's reasonable fees and expenses for attending, again provided that any payment is not tied to the outcome of the case or conditioned on the content or substance of the witness's testimony. 28 Of course, general rules are subject to exceptions, as where the law of a jurisdiction compels a different result, and the reasonableness of payments to fact witnesses frequently is in the eye of the beholder. No two courts are guaranteed to evaluate reasonableness the same way.
Id. (citation omitted
)
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Even if payments to a fact witness are reasonable, additional inducements, such as a party's promise to indemnify the witness in connection with the litigation, may prove to be too much. 30 Lawyers' and litigants' failures to disclose fact witnesses' compensation, or their failure to do so timely, as well as fact witnesses' failure to reveal their compensation when called upon to do so, can also affect the calculus.
31
If a lawyer's or a litigant's compensation of a fact witness is held to be improper, there are a number of possible consequences. For example, the court may order a new trial; 32 the lawyer or litigant or both may be sanctioned;
33 the lawyer may be disqualified from further participation in the litigation; 34 the lawyer may face professional discipline; 35 and the lawyer, party, and witness all may tempt criminal prosecution. 36 Courts generally are reluctant to exclude a witness's testimony on the sole basis that the witness has been paid, preferring to leave it to the jury to weigh the witness's credibility or, in court-tried cases, to weigh the testimony themselves. 37 This Article examines lawyers' and litigants' compensation of fact witnesses, with a primary focus on lawyers' conduct. Although this Article refers to fact witnesses, it should be understood that these are third-party fact witnesses-fact witnesses who are not employed by a party to the litigation in which they are expected to testify. Most fact witness compensation controversies involve third-party fact witnesses; parties' ordinary compensation of current employees for time spent testifying or preparing to testify is not controversial. 39 Courts and jurors well understand that fact witnesses who are currently employed by parties are being paid for their time devoted to a case and any potential bias on the part of such witnesses attributable to their employment is open for evaluation by the fact finder. 40 Part II analyzes applicable rules of professional conduct and the operation of the federal anti-bribery or anti-gratuity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201. 41 States may have bribery or witness tampering statutes similar to the federal anti-gratuity statute and lawyers must be sensitive to those, 42 but the case law on fact witness payments has mostly developed around the federal statute, making it the logical subject of discussion here. 43 Part III discusses illustrative cases, some in which the courts held that payments to fact witnesses were proper and others in which the courts rejected the compensation arrangements. 44 Finally, Part IV offers practical guidance to lawyers weighing whether and how to compensate fact witnesses. 45 
II. GOVERNING RULES AND STATUTES
Lawyers who are considering compensating third-party fact witnesses for their time spent testifying or preparing to testify must comply with rules of professional conduct in the process. 46 In addition, both lawyers and litigants who compensate fact witnesses must ensure that their conduct is permissible under the federal anti-bribery or antigratuity statute. 
A. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(b)
The most widely applicable ethics rule is Model Rule of Professional Conduct ("Model Rule") 3.4(b), which provides that a lawyer shall not "falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law."
48
Although "inducements" to witnesses commonly take the form of monetary payments, the term is not so limited. 49 Various other benefits promised to witnesses or advantages conferred on them may qualify as inducements for Model Rule 3.4(b) purposes. 50 Model Rule 3.4(b) reflects the concern that some financial arrangements with witnesses may encourage witnesses to exaggerate, shade, or even falsify their testimony, thereby undermining the integrity of the judicial process, which depends on truthful testimony by witnesses. 51 Recognizing that fact witnesses should not have to go outof-pocket to fulfill their civic responsibilities, however, Comment 3 to Model Rule 3.4 notes that "it is not improper to pay a witness's expenses," while cautioning lawyers that "[t]he common law rule in most jurisdictions is that it is improper to pay an occurrence witness any fee for testifying." 53 Consistent with the language of the Comment to the Rule, lawyers cannot compensate fact witnesses for testifying. 54 Lawyers may not pay fact witnesses for their testimony even if the testimony is truthful. 55 Perhaps more obviously, lawyers cannot condition fact witnesses' compensation on the content, substance, or perceived usefulness of their testimony, 56 nor may lawyers offer to pay fact witnesses fees that are contingent upon the outcome of the matter. The practical problem when looking at the plain language of Model Rule 3.4(b) and Comment 3 is that neither appears to permit lawyers to pay fact witnesses for time spent testifying at a deposition, hearing, trial, or other proceeding, or preparing to testify. 58 The Rule and Comment by their terms leave a substantial gap: compensating fact witnesses for their time spent testifying or preparing to testify is not the same as paying them for their testimony, which the common law prohibits, nor is it the same as paying their expenses, which is permissible. 59 At the same time, solid practical and policy reasons support compensating fact witnesses for their time and effort:
Some witnesses need to reacquaint themselves with voluminous paperwork. Matters that need revisiting may be both complex and far removed in time. Effective, organized testimony (the type useful to the parties and the court) often requires extensive and time-consuming preparation. There is no statutory or ethical requirement that a lawyer must be content with only a cursory, surface investigation of the facts. Nor must a lawyer limit him or herself to finding witnesses who have an abundance of time and money and can thus afford to cooperate fully. It would be unrealistic to expect all potential witnesses to be willing (or even able) to devote the tremendous amount of time necessary to make their testimony meaningful without compensating them for their lost time. Thus, payments to fact witnesses may be necessary to provide those witnesses with the proper incentive to prepare for their testimony in a thorough manner.
Payments to fact witnesses are also justifiable on fairness grounds. A conscientious witness may devote a large amount of time preparing to testify. Wholly separate from the question of giving the witness the incentive to prepare properly, there is also the question of what is the fair and equitable thing to do. Our court system is an instrument of justice; to compel people to provide testimony that will enable others to be compensated for their wrongs while denying those witnesses compensation seems unjust. 64 In addition, the Standing Committee noted that compensating witnesses for time spent attending trials, hearings, and other proceedings was authorized by some statutes and cases. 65 The Standing Committee therefore concluded that Model Rule 3.4(b) does not prohibit lawyers from paying fact witnesses for lost time.
66
Having determined that it was permissible for lawyers to compensate fact witnesses for time spent attending depositions and trials, the Standing Committee saw no reason to distinguish a lawyer: compensating a witness for time spent in pretrial interviews with the lawyer in preparation for testifying, as long as the lawyer makes it clear to the witness that the payment is not being made for the substance (or efficacy) of the witness's testimony or as an inducement to the witness to "tell the truth."
67
The Standing Committee further concluded that fact witnesses may be compensated for time spent reading and researching records that are germane to their testimony, provided such compensation is not barred by the law of the jurisdiction. so. 69 Rather, a witness's compensation "must be reasonable, so as to avoid affecting, even unintentionally, the content of the witness's testimony." 70 Weighing reasonableness may or may not be an easy task:
What is a reasonable amount [of compensation] is relatively easy to determine in situations where the witness can demonstrate to the lawyer that he has sustained a direct loss of income because of his time away from work-as, for example, [the] loss of hourly wages or professional fees. In situations, however, where the witness has not sustained any direct loss of income in connection with giving, or preparing to give, testimony-as, for example, where the witness is retired or unemployed-the lawyer must determine the reasonable value of the witness's time based on all relevant circumstances.
71
Once that determination has been made, however, nothing in the Model Rules prevents lawyers from compensating fact witnesses for their time spent testifying or preparing to testify.
72
The positions outlined in Formal Opinion 96-402 represent the majority rule. 73 Some courts and professional authorities, however, have declined to allow lawyers to compensate fact witnesses for preparation time, instead limiting payment for lost time to actual attendance at a deposition, hearing, or trial. 74 The Pennsylvania Bar Association has observed that the Pennsylvania version of Model Rule 3.4(b)(2), which expressly permits a lawyer to pay "reasonable compensation to a witness for the witness' loss of time in attending or testifying," 75 can be read to disfavor compensation to non-expert witnesses for the time invested in preparing for testimony, but has neither approved nor disapproved of the practice. 76 In other words, while Formal Opinion 96-402 represents the majority position, that approach is not unanimous.
The challenge for lawyers and courts in most cases is evaluating the reasonableness of witnesses' compensation and expenses. Judging the reasonableness of expenses is fairly easy: what was the actual cost incurred by the witness? The fact that a more frugal witness might have incurred expenses lower than those that a particular witness actually incurred does not make the latter's expenses unreasonable. Nor does providing a witness with some level of comfort or convenience in connection with her service necessarily transform an expense reimbursement into an improper inducement. For example, paying for a witness to fly first class from Los Angeles to New York rather than making the witness fly coach should be considered perfectly reasonable.
77 Lodging a fact witness in a nice hotel rather than housing the witness in a lower-cost hotel is similarly reasonable. 78 For that matter, it will be a rare case in which a witness's expense reimbursement will be so generous or unusual that it will constitute an impermissible inducement.
With respect to witness compensation, reasonableness requires a logical relationship between the amount paid to the witness and the time the witness spent preparing to testify and appearing. 79 The closer a witness's compensation comes to approximating her direct loss of income, the more likely it is to be found reasonable. 80 In contrast, compensation that is disproportionate to the time on the case spent by the witness is potentially troubling, as a recent New York case, Caldwell v. Cablevision Systems Corp., 81 somewhat awkwardly illustrates. had been working on the street in the area where she fell. 84 In its defense, CSI subpoenaed the physician who had treated Caldwell in the hospital emergency room and who, when recording her medical history, had noted that she had tripped over her dog. 85 The doctor testified consistently with his note on direct examination. 86 On cross examination by Caldwell's lawyer, the doctor testified that CSI had paid him $10,000 for appearing and testifying. 87 This dwarfed the statutory witness fee of $15 per day and $0.23 per mile to which the doctor was entitled. 88 The doctor denied that the payment influenced his testimony; he testified only to his note in the emergency room record and he offered no medical opinions. 89 Caldwell asked the court to strike the doctor's testimony or issue a curative instruction or a jury charge regarding monetary influence.
90 CSI argued that there was nothing wrong with paying a fact witness for time missed from work. 91 The court opted to allow the parties to argue the doctor's compensation in their summations as long as they did not specifically refer to the witness fee statute. 92 The court also gave a general bias instruction.
93
The jury returned a verdict for CSI and Caldwell appealed. 94 The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in allowing the doctor's testimony, and that, while the trial court should have better instructed the jury on bias, that error was harmless. 95 Caldwell then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
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Although the Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the Appellate Division on the basis that any trial court error was harmless, the court was disturbed by the fact that CSI paid the doctor $10,000 for one hour of testimony. 97 It probably did not help that CSI did not attempt to justify the amount of the payment in the Court of Appeals. The Caldwell court observed that the doctor had received a substantial payment for minimal testimony. 99 This was deeply troubling because payments to fact witnesses that are "exorbitant as compared to the amount of time the witness spends away from work or business, create an unflattering intimation that the testimony is being bought or, at the very least, has been unconsciously influenced by the compensation provided." 100 Although statutory witness fees are merely compensatory minimums, such that Caldwell could not win her argument that the doctor was entitled to nothing more than $15 plus mileage, the doctor's grossly disproportionate witness fee was hard for the court to swallow. 101 The court specifically noted that "the distinction between paying a fact witness for testimony and paying a fact witness for time and reasonable expenses can easily become blurred." There was no opportunity for the doctor to tailor his testimony to benefit CSI. 104 It is a stretch even to think that might have been necessary, since, in a trip-and-fall case, the plaintiff's admission that she stumbled over her own dog is about as good as it gets from a defense perspective.
105
It appears from the Appellate Division opinion that CSI paid the doctor a fee close to that which he would charge if he appeared as an expert witness. 106 The problem with that approach is that the doctor did not testify as an expert witness; he appeared at trial in order to regurgitate his note in the plaintiff's medical record. 107 problem with what would likely be a very different outcome simply by changing a few facts. Assume that the doctor did not record Caldwell's admission about tripping over her dog in the medical history he took from her. Instead, he is called as a witness at trial and testifies that Caldwell admitted stumbling over her dog but he did not record it in his notes. Caldwell's statement about stumbling over her dog comes into evidence as an admission against interest or as a statement made for medical diagnosis or treatment. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2), 803(4) (demarking statements that are covered by the hearsay rule, and listing the exceptions to that rule). In our hypothetical case, the $10,000 payment to the doctor arguably takes on the appearance of an improper inducement to a witness or, to put it slightly differently, the $10,000 at least superficially appears to be payment for the content or substance of the doctor's testimony rather than compensation for his lost time. The question would then become the remedy to be afforded Caldwell, if any, with potential consequences for the defense lawyers and doctor to follow.
106 courts generally view treating physicians as fact witnesses, rather than as expert witnesses. 108 A better argument for CSI might have been that it was compensating the doctor for his time away from his practice. This theory at least has legs; the doctor testified on cross examination that when he testified as an expert in other cases his fees were a substitute for the fees he would have earned if he was instead seeing patients or performing surgery.
109 By extension, then, although he was a fact witness in Caldwell's case, paying him a fee commensurate with the fee he would have charged as an expert witness was reasonable because it simply compensated him for his lost time. But even then, the $10,000 witness fee was so disproportionate to the time the doctor spent testifying-testimony that required no preparation-that justifying the amount was effectively impossible. 110 Finally, for now, there is the question of reasonable compensation for fact witnesses who are retired or unemployed. One ethics body has suggested that compensating a retired former employee of a party for time spent testifying or preparing to testify may be improper because the former employee would not sustain "any direct loss of income" in serving as a fact witness.
111 But a fact witness's retirement or unemployment does not render his or her time valueless.
112 Everyone's time is worth something. 113 For that reason, the better view is that retired and unemployed fact witnesses are entitled to reasonable compensation for time spent testifying or preparing to testify. 114 The amounts to be paid to such witnesses generally do, however, require closer consideration than when, say, a fact witness employed by a non-party is being reimbursed for lost wages. 115 Even so, paying a retired or unemployed witness an hourly rate approximating that which they last earned in their most recent employment should generally pass muster. 
B. California Rule of Professional Conduct 5-310
California has not adopted the Model Rules, although it is gradually moving toward doing so. 117 There is a dearth of authority on Rule 5-310(B), most likely due to its overall clarity. To the extent Rule 5-310(B) is uncertain, the California State Bar's Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, known to California lawyers as COPRAC, tried to fill any gaps in formal ethics opinion 1997-149. 120 In that opinion, the committee concluded that it is appropriate: to compensate a witness for otherwise uncompensated time necessary for preparation for or testifying at deposition or trial, as long as the compensation is reasonable in conformance with rule 5-310(B), does not violate applicable law, and is not paid to a witness contingent upon the content of the witness' testimony or the outcome of the case. 121 Those principles apply regardless of whether a witness "is currently employed, unemployed, retired, suspended or in any other employment status." [w]hoever . . . directly or indirectly gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any person, for or because of the testimony under oath or affirmation given or to be given by such person as a witness upon a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, before any court, any committee or either House or both Houses of Congress, or any agency, commission, or officer authorized by the laws of the United States to hear evidence or take testimony shall be fined or imprisoned for up to two years, or both. 127 Notably, "whoever" as used in the statute does not include federal prosecutors functioning within the scope of their office who pay cooperating witnesses, even when the payments are solely for the witnesses' testimony, "so long as the payment is not for or because of any corruption of the truth of testimony."
128 Other lawyers and parties litigating in federal courts, however, are not expressly afforded such leeway. 129. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (recognizing that a person can be charged with bribery for providing money to a witness without finding any type of corrupt motivation).
Section 201(c)(2) by its terms does not prohibit payments to fact witnesses made for purposes other than the fact or content of their testimony. 130 Or, stated positively, the statute permits lawyers and parties to compensate fact witnesses for time lost to testifying. 131 This limit on § 201(c)(2)'s otherwise long reach is made manifest in 18 U.S.C. § 201(d), which states that § 201(c)(2) does not "prohibit the payment . . . of witness fees provided by law, or the payment, by the party upon whose behalf a witness is called . . . of the reasonable cost of travel and subsistence incurred and the reasonable value of time lost in attendance at any such trial, hearing, or proceeding."
132 Furthermore, and consistent with these positions, nothing in § 201(c)(2) establishes that a person violates the law by paying fact witnesses for time spent in legitimate non-testimonial activities, such as meeting with counsel for a party or reviewing documents in preparation for testifying.
133 Payment for such activities is allowable because it is not extended "for or because of [the] testimony" of the witness. 134 Indeed, the weight of authority holds that witnesses' time spent on legitimate non-testimonial activities is permitted under the anti-gratuity statute, provided the amount of compensation is reasonable. With § 201(d), as with ethics rules, the essential inquiry often is whether a witness's compensation for litigation-related time is reasonable. 136 To make this determination, a court must examine the circumstances of the particular case. 137 Among the factors a court may consider when evaluating the reasonableness of a witness's compensation are the hourly rate paid to the witness and the number of hours spent by the witness in connection with the litigation.
138 This is always a case-specific inquiry; there is no precise or uniform measure of reasonableness. 139 Finally, if a court determines that a fact witness's compensation does not violate § 201(c)(2), it necessarily determines in the process that the lawyer who approved, acquiesced in, or orchestrated the payments did not violate the Model Rule 3.4(b) prohibition on offering an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law.
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D. Summary and Synthesis
In summary, the majority rule holds that lawyers may compensate fact witnesses for time spent testifying, preparing to testify, or otherwise assisting in litigation, and may reimburse witnesses' related expenses, provided the amounts paid are reasonable, are not conditioned on the act of testifying or the content or substance of the witness's testimony, and are not contingent upon the outcome of the litigation.
141 Reasonable compensation for time spent testifying, preparing to testify, or otherwise assisting in litigation is not an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law within the meaning of Model Rule 3.4(b), 142 nor is it a violation of the federal anti-gratuity statute as interpreted by most courts to have considered the issue. 143 The reasonableness of a witness's compensation is measured objectively, 144 or at least as objectively as possible on the facts presented. Evaluating reasonableness requires case-specific inquiry. 145 The closer a witness's compensation comes to approximating her direct loss of income, the more likely it is to be found reasonable. 146 witnesses whose agreed compensation cannot be shown to be reasonable should not necessarily be denied all payment for their lost time. 147 It may be possible to lower or restructure a witness's compensation to make it reasonable.
148 Alternatively, a court may limit a witness to the recovery of statutory witness fees and expenses. 149 Courts may consider a number of factors in making reasonableness determinations, including: (1) the time spent by the witness in connection with the litigation; (2) the hourly rate paid to the witness by her employer if the witness is currently employed; (3) the witness's regular fees or regular hourly rates if the witness is self-employed; (4) the witness's most recent wages or earnings, or what others earn for comparable activities, if the witness is unemployed or retired; (5) the witness's special qualifications, such as experience, expertise, or specialized knowledge that cannot practicably be supplied by others; (6) the value of opportunities or alternative employment that a witness must forego to participate in the litigation, whether because of the time commitment required or because of other factors; (7) the inconvenience or hardship experienced by the witness as a result of her involvement in the litigation, which may or may not overlap with the preceding element; (8) the witness's occupation, trade, or profession, which, again, may or may not intersect with some of the prior factors; and (9) practical constraints, such as whether the witness has unique factual knowledge or is beyond the court's subpoena power. 150 This list is not exhaustive and other considerations may be relevant in particular cases. 153 As one author and veteran trial lawyer has observed, only half-joking, the "reasonable" value of a witness's lost time "means whatever the individual judge who is looking at your individual facts thinks it means." 154 Finally, while some compensation arrangements are clearly improper and should have been so recognized before they were entered into, as where a witness is to be paid for her testimony, 155 in other cases, subtle or unappreciated factual differences may lead to very different results.
156 Nonetheless, it is helpful to examine some cases in which courts either approved or disapproved of witnesses' compensation in an effort to better understand how related controversies play out.
A. Cases Approving Fact Witnesses' Compensation
In Prasad v. MML Investor Services, Inc., 157 the plaintiffs sought to vacate a National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") arbitration award in favor of the defendant, MML Investor Services, Inc. ("MMLISI"). 158 They alleged in the arbitration case that they were defrauded in a Ponzi scheme operated by a former MMLISI representative, Nagajara Thayagarajan. 159 One of the witnesses who testified for MMLISI in the arbitration was Stanley Farr, a former compliance officer with the firm, who, while still employed by MMLISI, had investigated Thayagarajan's alleged misconduct. 160 At the time he testified, Farr was self-employed as a compliance consultant and charged his clients at a rate of $125 per hour.
161 After Farr's third day of testimony in the arbitration, the plaintiffs complained to the arbitrators that Farr was receiving "illegal compensation" as a fact witness and that the time he "spent in 'witness prep' amounted to witness tampering and expenses incurred in attending trial or testifying); Goldstein v constituted subornation of perjury." 162 The arbitration panel allowed the plaintiffs to recall Farr as a witness and question him regarding his compensation by MMLISI. 163 Farr testified that MMLISI had reimbursed him for his time spent on the arbitration at an hourly rate of $125, the same rate he charged clients as a self-employed consultant. 164 He explained that he was not paid to testify in any particular manner. 165 He also testified that while he did not prepare any witnesses to testify in the arbitration proceeding, he was present when MMLISI's lawyers prepared other witnesses. 166 Finally, Farr's invoices to MMLISI indicated that he was also reimbursed for his travel expenses, including air fare, car rental, hotels, and meals. 167 At the close of Farr's testimony, the plaintiffs moved to strike the testimony of all of MMLISI's witnesses on the basis that MMLISI had improperly paid Farr for his testimony and time. 168 After due consideration, the arbitrators denied the plaintiffs' motion to strike the witnesses' testimony, and further denied the plaintiffs' claims against MMLISI in their entirety, without explaining the bases for their decisions. 169 The plaintiffs then petitioned a New York federal court to vacate the arbitration award.
170
In the district court, the plaintiffs asserted that the arbitration panel acted in manifest disregard of the law when it declined to strike the witnesses' testimony.
171
The plaintiffs did not challenge the reasonableness of Farr's expenses, nor did they contend that he was paid for anything other than his time and expenses. 172 Rather, they argued it was improper for MMLISI to have paid Farr to participate in witness preparation. 173 The plaintiffs further complained that MMLISI did not reveal Farr's compensation or services before they were exposed on cross examination, a lapse the plaintiffs characterized as "troubling." 174 Their arguments did not impress the court. As the court explained: A witness may be compensated for the time spent preparing to testify or otherwise consulting on a litigation matter in addition to time spent testifying in a deposition or at trial.
That a fact witness has been retained to act as a litigation consultant does not, in and of itself, appear to be improper, absent some indication that the retention was designed as a financial inducement or as a method to secure the cooperation of a hostile witness, or was otherwise improper. Although Farr was retained by MMLISI after he was approached by [the plaintiffs] to testify as a witness, that fact alone is insufficient to establish that MMLISI's retention of his services as a consultant was improper as a matter of law, particularly in view of Farr's testimony that he was initially contacted by MMLISI's counsel regarding [the plaintiffs'] claims . . . long before he was approached by [the plaintiffs]. 175 Therefore, the plaintiffs could not show that Farr's compensation by MMLISI violated any governing legal principles. 176 The amount of Farr's compensation certainly did not concern the court.
177 Indeed, the fact that MMLISI paid Farr the same rate he charged his clients as a self-employed compliance consultant was a compelling display of reasonableness. 178 Finally, while the court acknowledged that a lawyer's or witness's failure to timely divulge the witness's compensation may sometimes be "troubling,"
179 this was not such a case. 180 Contrary to the plaintiffs' assertion that the nature of Farr's relationship with MMLISI surfaced for the first time on cross examination, Farr testified during his first day of direct examination that he had located and interviewed a number of potential witnesses at the request of MMLISI's counsel. 181 At that time, he and MMLISI's counsel also made clear that he was being paid for his time spent in connection with the arbitration.
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To the extent the plaintiffs were upset by Farr being present when MMLISI's counsel met with other witnesses, they could cite no authority for the proposition that lawyers are prohibited from meeting with multiple witnesses at the same time. 183 The plaintiffs offered no evidence to support their allegations of witness tampering. Accordingly, the court in Prasad confirmed the arbitration award in favor of MMLISI.
185
Prasad illustrates at least two key points for lawyers. First, it shows the importance of linking fact witnesses' compensation to their direct losses of income. 186 The tighter the linkage between a witness's lost income and the payments to the witness, the greater the probability that the court will hold the witness's compensation to be reasonable. 187 Second, the decision highlights the wisdom of disclosing compensation arrangements with witnesses. 188 In fact, the disclosure in Prasad might have been made earlier. 189 Many prudent lawyers disclose fact witnesses' compensation in discovery at a time when an opponent can explore the subject if it wishes, but disclosure on direct examination in a proceeding presents a last clear chance to avoid potential problems. possible fact witness several months earlier, and the defendant had already indicated its intent to depose him based on his identification in the plaintiffs' disclosures. 196 Carey agreed to assist the plaintiffs and he soon traveled to Detroit to inspect the tracks at issue and to meet with the plaintiffs' counsel. 197 Approximately two weeks later, Laurence Shiekman of Pepper formally retained Carey as a consultant to assist the firm in preparing the plaintiffs' case, with the possibility of his testimony at trial left open. 198 In the letter engaging Carey as a consultant, Shiekman indicated that Conrail would pay Carey for his services directly at the same rate specified in his earlier consulting agreement.
199 Shortly thereafter, a Conrail lawyer, Jonathan Broder, agreed to increase Carey's rate to $125 per hour when Carey reported that he had done some unrelated consulting work at that higher rate. 200 Carey eventually consulted on the matter for just over thirty hours, for which Conrail owed him slightly more than $4000.
201
The defendant deposed Carey in December 2009. 202 The defendant's lawyer asked Carey if he was being compensated for his deposition appearance. 203 Carey said he was and defense counsel attempted to inquire further. 204 The plaintiffs' lawyer, Matthew Lund, halted further questioning on the basis that Carey's consulting agreement was confidential. 205 After some motion practice in which the details of Carey's consulting arrangement and compensation were revealed, Carey's deposition continued pursuant to court order. 206 Carey testified regarding his consulting arrangement, although he was a little uncertain about who had engaged him (Conrail versus Pepper) and the specific agreement governing his consultancy (the 1999 agreement or Shiekman's letter). 207 When trial finally drew near, the defendant moved to exclude Carey's testimony because he was "an improperly paid fact witness and charged an unreasonable rate of $125 per hour for his time providing factual testimony."
208 Pushing back, the plaintiffs argued that they did not pay Carey for his testimony and that he was reasonably compensated for his expenses and time lost while meeting with them, reviewing documents, and being deposed. 209 The district court began its analysis by noting that public policy forbids lawyers and others from compensating fact witnesses beyond the reasonable value of their time lost and reasonable expenses. 210 Though the federal anti-gratuity statute forbids the compensation of witnesses for their testimony, the court recognized that 18 U.S.C. § 201(d) permits payment for the "reasonable cost of travel and subsistence incurred and the reasonable value of time lost in attendance" at hearings, trials, or proceedings. 211 The § 201(d) exception extends to time fact witnesses spend reviewing documents and meeting with lawyers. 212 According to the Consolidated Rail court, a lawyer acting on a client's behalf may pay a fact witness for time spent preparing for or attending a deposition or trial as long as the lawyer does not condition payment on the content of the witness's testimony. 213 The district court easily concluded that Carey's consulting arrangement was ethical under Model Rule 3.4(b). 214 The defendant, however, argued that the plaintiffs' initial attempt to conceal the consulting agreement was a strong indicator of improper conduct. 215 The court agreed that the plaintiffs' lawyers "displayed some troubling behavior" in resisting discovery of Carey's consulting arrangements, but noted that: (1) Lund's refusal to permit Carey to be questioned on the subject was based on his misunderstanding of the work product doctrine; and (2) neither Carey nor the plaintiffs' lawyers attempted to hide the fact that Carey was a paid consultant. 216 Those facts distinguished this case from other cases in which courts had sanctioned parties or fact witnesses who had allegedly acted in bad faith in trying to conceal consulting relationships. 217 While Carey had been unclear about the date and some terms of his consulting agreement and who had retained him as a consultant, it was probable that he was innocently confused or mistaken. 218 The court saw no reason to doubt his honesty since he had revealed his consulting relationship the first time he was asked about it in his deposition.
219
The defendant argued that the plaintiffs' retention of Carey as a consultant after it had indicated its intention to depose him was further evidence of improper conduct. 220 The court disagreed. 221 The plaintiffs had identified Carey as a possible fact witness in their initial disclosures before the defendant noticed his deposition, and Carey had previously worked with Broder and Shiekman on Conrail matters. 222 Thus, the fact that the plaintiffs retained Carey as a consultant after his deposition was noticed was not enough for the court to infer that his retention was improper.
223
Of course, even assuming that the plaintiffs properly retained Carey as a consultant, his compensation had to be reasonable "so as to avoid affecting, even unintentionally, the content of [his] testimony." 224 Although there had been some disagreement in discovery about Carey's hourly rate ($85 versus $125), which the defendant asserted was a deceptive smokescreen, the court attributed any confusion to the rate increase granted by Broder after Shiekman retained Carey, and to confusion between Broder and the lawyers at Pepper. 225 Given that the $125 hourly rate that Conrail paid to Carey matched that which he had charged another client for consulting work, it did not appear to be excessive or unreasonable. 226 In light of all the evidence, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had not paid Carey for or because of his testimony, and thus that they had not violated the federal anti-gratuity statute. 227 To the contrary, they had reimbursed Carey's expenses and reasonably paid him for his lost time. 228 The court therefore declined to exclude Carey's testimony, although it did permit the defendant to cross examine Carey on his consulting agreements at trial.
229
Consolidated Rail reflects some of the miscommunications, misjudgments, and timing issues that can complicate litigation, such as the plaintiffs identifying Carey as a fact witness before they retained him as a consultant, Lund mistakenly believing that Carey's consulting relationship was immune from discovery as work product, the confusion between Conrail's in-house counsel and its outside counsel, and Carey's own uncertainty over the contours of his consulting relationship. 230 But none of those stumbles left a mark because the plaintiffs paid Carey for his lost time rather than for his testimony, Carey's compensation was objectively reasonable, and Carey disclosed his consulting relationship with the plaintiffs when he was asked about it at his deposition. 231 Long story short, the plaintiffs, their lawyers, and Carey touched the key points and acted in good faith-even if their actions or judgments were imperfect.
232
B. Cases Disapproving of Fact Witnesses' Compensation New York v. Solvent Chemical Co.
233 is regarded as a leading case opposing fact witness compensation, though that is an ambitious interpretation of the decision. 234 In Solvent, the State of New York sued a company named ICC Industrial, Inc. ("ICC") and other defendants for environmental pollution at an industrial chemical facility in the town of Niagara Falls, known as the Buffalo Avenue site. 235 The suit was filed in 1983, and in 1986, ICC and Solvent Chemical Company, Inc. ("Solvent") filed a variety of third-party claims. 236 In 1995, discovery finally focused on ICC's potential liability as an operator of the Buffalo Avenue site or as the corporate parent of Solvent, which had run the industrial chemical facility. 237 In turn, a dispute arose over ICC's retention of its former employee Eric Beu, who was an important fact witness, as a litigation consultant.
238
In the 1970s, Beu was a vice president of both ICC and its whollyowned subsidiary, Dover Chemical Corp. ("Dover"). 239 He left ICC and Dover in 1979. 240 He later brought an arbitration proceeding against ICC related to his departure, which he lost. 241 Beu had not worked in the ICC and Solvent corrected his testimony. 256 On the third day of the deposition, Beu was asked whether he had any consulting relationships with any of the parties. 257 He answered affirmatively and then explained the terms of his consulting relationship and agreement, testified that he had worked somewhere between twenty and fifty hours on the case, explained that he did all of his work after he had been subpoenaed to give his deposition, and said that he was not being paid for his deposition time.
258 Beu declined to answer questions regarding the exact nature of his consulting work on the advice of his lawyer. 259 Beu also refused to produce a copy of the consulting agreement and the invoices for his time, based on his lawyer's assertion that it constituted work product. 260 A discovery dispute ensued.
261
The court easily concluded that Beu's consulting agreement and related documents were not immune from discovery as work product.
262
As the court explained, work product protection must yield to conduct by litigants or their lawyers that "erode[s] the integrity of the adversary process," and here the conduct of ICC and Solvent and their lawyers with respect to Beu had "threatened to undermine the integrity of the adversary process." 263 In particular: or in ICC's payment of a reasonable hourly fee for his time. 265 But in indemnifying Beu in connection with the Dover litigation and this case "as a means of obtaining his cooperation as a fact witness, ICC and Solvent went too far." 266 In addition, the circumstances surrounding ICC's retention of Beu as a consultant were suspicious. 267 As the court stated:
ICC must have been well aware, prior to OCC's serving of a subpoena on Mr. Beu, that Mr. Beu was an extremely important fact witness in this case. The company has been a defendant since the original complaint was filed in 1983. But it was only after service of the subpoena in July 1995-when it became clear that OCC and other parties were intending to obtain both documents and testimony from Mr. Beu-that ICC moved to acquire Mr. Beu's services as a "litigation consultant." The timing of ICC's actions creates, in and of itself, an appearance of impropriety that serves to further undermine the company's claim of work product protection for the consulting agreement and related materials. And ICC's identification of Mr. Beu as a member of its trial team inevitably raises concerns as to whether he can be counted on to testify fully and impartially on a key issue in this case-the extent to which ICC was involved in the operations of Solvent and the Buffalo Avenue site at the time the site was owned and/or operated by Solvent.
268
The court was also disturbed by the fact that no one among Beu, his lawyers, ICC's lawyers, and Solvent's lawyers took the initiative to disclose Beu's consulting arrangement. 269 When asked on the first day of his deposition whether he had any current relationship with ICC or Solvent, Beu not only wrongly denied the existence of his consulting relationship, but neither his lawyers nor ICC's or Solvent's counsel corrected the record. 270 Finally, the court shredded ICC for its "perturbing" reliance on the work product doctrine to withhold Beu's consulting agreement. 271 The court stated:
The basis for its claim of work product protection is that the agreement "contains and reflects ICC's litigation strategy and the thoughts, mental impressions and opinions of ICC's counsel." The court is at a loss as to why ICC would incorporate such sensitive information in a written contract with an important fact witness. It must have been obvious at the time the contract was drafted that other parties to the litigation would be disturbed by the existence of the agreement, and would be likely to seek production of the document. It may be that the agreement sets forth the contours, and even some details, of Mr. Beu's responsibilities as a "litigation consultant," and that such provisions might in themselves reveal something of ICC's litigation strategy. But the impropriety of ICC's conduct in relation to Mr. Beu dictates that the company must forfeit any protection that it might otherwise claim to such information.
272
The court ordered ICC to produce to the other parties copies of all documents that Beu reviewed in his consulting, any documents or notes that he prepared as a consultant, and all notes or other documents reflecting communications with or by Beu. 273 The court also ordered ICC to produce Beu for further deposition at its expense, including paying the fees of the moving parties' lawyers.
274
At base, the Solvent court enforced something close to the common law prohibition on paying fact witnesses for their testimony. 275 ICC and Solvent might have insisted that they had simply paid Beu for his time assisting them in the litigation, but that argument was doomed from the get-go. Its fate was sealed by the settlement of the Dover litigation claims against Beu and the indemnity agreements extended to Beu, which appeared to be inducements to Beu to testify favorably for ICC and Solvent. 276 Those agreements rendered Beu's compensation objectively unreasonable. 277 But even had ICC and Solvent merely paid Beu for his time spent analyzing and explaining musty papers bearing his name or handwriting, they still would have had no good arguments for resisting discovery of his consulting agreement or related documents.
What the Solvent court clearly did not do was prohibit lawyers or others from paying fact witnesses for their time spent testifying or preparing to testify, or for otherwise assisting in preparing a case for trial. 278 To the contrary, the court emphasized that "there is nothing improper about the payment of a reasonable hourly fee for the services 280 involved a contract dispute between Rocheux International of New Jersey, Inc. ("Rocheux"), which was a distributor of plastic materials, and several plastic product-packaging providers. 281 The defendants alleged that a former employee of one of them, Jorge Gutierrez, had approached Rocheux's lawyer, Brian McAlindin, and offered to provide damaging testimony against the defendants in exchange for a fee. 282 McAlindin arranged to pay Gutierrez over $4000 for his testimony. 283 McAlindin originally identified Gutierrez as a fact witness, but, after the deadline for disclosing expert witnesses had passed, he informed defense counsel that he would be eliciting expert testimony from Gutierrez. 284 As part of that expert witness disclosure, McAlindin submitted an affidavit from Gutierrez, stating that the defendant for which he once worked had changed data in its accounting system and had engaged in other unethical business practices at its CEO's direction. 285 The defendants noticed Gutierrez's deposition. 286 McAlindin then informed them that Gutierrez would charge $1500 for his deposition testimony. 287 The deposition proceeded and Gutierrez testified that McAlindin had paid him more than $4000 to date, but that he understood that fee to be payment for his consulting work, "specifically, his communications with Rocheux's lawyers and reviewing his affidavit" rather than his expert testimony. 288 He testified that he had contacted Rocheux's lawyers to tell them that he had information he thought might be helpful to the lawsuit. 289 whether Rocheux would use his testimony. 290 When questioned on the subjects on which he was designated as an expert, Gutierrez gave equivocal and uninformed answers that did not help Rocheux's case. 291 The defendants moved to exclude Gutierrez as an improperly paid fact witness and contended that Rocheux designated him as an expert witness to deliberately circumvent the prohibition against paying fact witnesses for testifying. 292 They further sought to invalidate Gutierrez's $1500 deposition fee and requested "appropriate sanctions for the unethical behavior of [the] [p]laintiff's counsel." 293 After referring to New Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(b), the Rocheux court asserted that lawyers may: (1) reimburse fact witnesses for reasonable expenses incurred in attending trial; and (2) reasonably pay witnesses for their time lost in appearing to testify. 294 The court further stated that Congress codified this common law principle in the federal anti-gratuity statute. 295 Here, it was crystal clear that Gutierrez was a fact witness and that McAlindin had improperly paid Gutierrez for his testimony. 296 When asked to identify the expert opinions in Gutierrez's affidavit, McAlindin pointed to "factual evidence based on lay observations" that lacked the reliable methodology required by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 297 for the admission of expert testimony. 298 McAlindin could not otherwise explain why Gutierrez should be treated as an expert witness. 299 Furthermore, the fee paid to Gutierrez "most certainly did not compensate [him] for his costs of attending trial or time lost during trial." 300 In summary, McAlindin's payment to Gutierrez violated the longstanding ban on paying fact witnesses for their testimony. 301 The court reasoned that McAlindin's decision to pay Gutierrez for factual testimony had "cast a cloud over the legitimacy of that testimony," and that it was up to the court "to prevent this suspect evidence from contaminating future proceedings." 302 from paying Gutierrez's expert fee for his deposition, and awarded the defendants their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred as a result of McAlindin's misconduct. 303 Somewhat ominously, the court noted that the defendants had not moved to disqualify McAlindin and that such a severe sanction did not currently appear to be necessary, but cautioned that it would "reserve judgment on the need for additional sanctions or disciplinary action pending further application." 304 McAlindin's reported conduct in Rocheux was seriously misguided. Gutierrez clearly was a fact witness-a largely useless one as it turned out, but a fact witness nonetheless-and his compensation was objectively unreasonable. 305 McAlindin plainly paid Gutierrez for his testimony rather than for his time. 306 In the end, though, what distinguishes Rocheux is the fact that Gutierrez was a former employee of a defendant rather than a former employee of Rocheux. 307 Paying a fact witness who is a former employee of an adversary, rather than a former employee of the party that the person is assisting, invites accusations of misconduct. 308 That is not to say the practice is always improper, but, from a lawyer's perspective, it will be a rare case in which the potential reward outweighs the associated risk.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LAWYERS
Lawyers handling litigation, arbitration, or administrative proceedings will, at some point, either want to compensate fact witnesses for assisting them in matters or will be asked by fact witnesses about the possibility of compensation for their time or services. How should careful lawyers approach these situations?
First, lawyers should attempt to ascertain the law of the jurisdiction on compensating fact witnesses. 309 This may require analysis of applicable rules of professional conduct, case law, and ethics opinions by state or local bar associations, as well as state statutes pertaining to bribery and witness tampering and cases interpreting those statutes. State and federal courts may have local rules bearing on the issue, and, in federal cases, there is the federal anti-gratuity statute to keep in mind. 310 Depending on where a fact witness resides, a case is pending, or a lawyer practices, there may be choice of law considerations to sort through. 311 Second, lawyers should never pay fact witnesses for their testimony, regardless of whether the payment is for the fact of a witness's testimony, or its content or substance. 312 A fact witness's compensation may never be contingent upon the fact, content, or substance of the witness's testimony, or the outcome of the litigation. 313 A requirement that a witness's testimony be truthful will not cure any of these ills. 314 Third, but consistent with the prior point, lawyers should compensate fact witnesses only for their time lost to testifying, preparing to testify, or otherwise legitimately assisting in the preparation of a case, plus reimbursement of reasonable expenses incurred in connection with those activities. 315 Any compensation should be objectively reasonable. 316 The closer a fact witness's compensation comes to approximating her direct loss of income, the more likely a court will find it to be reasonable. 317 In the absence of direct loss, a lawyer should calculate the "reasonable value of the witness's time based on all of the relevant circumstances." 318 At bottom, there must be an explainable and logical connection between the amount of time or effort a fact witness devotes to a matter and the amount of the witness's compensation. 319 Lawyers should not offer benefits to fact witnesses in addition to reasonable payment for time lost or reimbursement of reasonable expenses that courts or disciplinary authorities may view as influencing, even unintentionally, the witness's testimony. 320 Such benefits might include promises of future employment or business opportunities with the lawyer's client, promises of favorable treatment in transactions or business dealings with the lawyer's client, arrangements or extensions of loans or credit, forgiveness of debts owed to the lawyer's client, or indemnity agreements. Returning for a moment to the Solvent case, ICC's and Dover's agreements to indemnify Beu are prime examples of arrangements with witnesses that courts may well regard as improper inducements. 321 Fourth, lawyers should avoid paying fact witnesses who were formerly employed by another party in the litigation-especially an opposing party. 322 They should be similarly cautious when considering whether to compensate fact witnesses who, while not formerly employed by an adversary, are expected to be key witnesses for that party. 323 To be sure, cases in which lawyers have been sanctioned or reprimanded for compensating former employees of opposing parties or key witnesses for adversaries have involved obviously impermissible payments for testimony rather than reasonable compensation for time lost, but it remains true that certain categories of fact witnesses are more likely to invite charges of unethical payment or witness tampering, and these are two of them. 324 None of this is to say that fact witnesses falling into these categories never can be properly compensated by a party other than a former employer or expected beneficiary of their testimony, but it is to say that the risks of compensating these witnesses frequently outweigh any possible rewards, and that lawyers should therefore exercise extreme caution in this area.
Fifth, lawyers should not purport to prohibit fact witnesses from speaking with other parties or their lawyers as part of any compensation arrangement. 325 Rules of professional conduct generally prevent lawyers from attempting to so restrict witnesses. 326 For example, Model Rule 3.4(f) establishes that a lawyer cannot "request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party" except in very limited circumstances. 327 Sixth, lawyers should put compensation agreements with fact witnesses in writing. 328 An agreement should clearly state that the witness is being compensated for the reasonable value of her time and being reimbursed for her reasonable expenses rather than being paid for the fact, content, or substance of her testimony. 329 Accuracy and clarity are important here for two reasons. First, witnesses must understand what is expected of them. Second, compensation agreements with fact witnesses will almost certainly have to be produced in discovery, and it is critical that they be drafted in ways that will discourage challenges by opposing parties and withstand scrutiny by reviewing courts. 330 Specifying in writing that witnesses are being compensated solely for the reasonable value of their time and are being reimbursed for the reasonable value of their expenses is essential to discouraging and surviving such challenges and scrutiny.
Finally, lawyers should inform the other parties in a case of the existence and terms of any agreements to compensate fact witnesses. 331 This should be done sufficiently early in a case to permit other parties to conduct discovery on the issue if they wish. 332 Certainly, lawyers should accurately and timely respond to written discovery regarding fact witnesses' compensation or employment. 333 If witnesses are directly asked about their compensation in depositions and answer inaccurately, the lawyers producing them for their depositions must correct their testimony. 334 If a witness is not asked about her compensation in a deposition and it has not previously been revealed in some other context or form, the lawyer producing the witness for the deposition may want to consider revealing the compensation arrangement before the deposition is adjourned, so that any party that wants to explore the subject is then able to do so.
Setting aside for a moment the clearly improper practice of paying fact witnesses solely for their testimony, paying a fact witness only for the reasonable value of her time and expenses incurred in testifying at a deposition, trial, or other proceeding is rarely controversial. 335 Most battles arise out of consulting arrangements in which witnesses devote significant time to case preparation, or to otherwise assisting in some fashion, the lawyers for the party paying them. 336 Even so, lawyers may wish to disclose all fact witness compensation agreements, no matter how obviously reasonable or innocuous, simply to avoid accusations of misconduct by aggressive adversaries.
V. CONCLUSION
The ASPCA paid dearly for employing Tom Rider to help it champion the ethical treatment of circus elephants. 337 Most cases in which lawyers or parties pay fact witnesses for their services are much tamer. But the fact remains that compensating fact witnesses is a potentially perilous exercise. The general rule that lawyers and litigants may compensate fact witnesses for time spent testifying or preparing to testify, and may reimburse witnesses' associated expenses, so long as the amounts paid to or on behalf of a witness are reasonable, is not uniformly applied or reliably followed. 338 Unfortunately, this general rule, like others, has exceptions, and even in jurisdictions that regularly adhere to it, the reasonableness of fact witnesses' compensation is a recurring point of controversy. The best that can be said is that when it comes to compensating fact witnesses, the price is only sometimes right.
